Barriers and Recommendations to Innovative Ownership Models for Wind Power by Jensen, Louise Krog et al.
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Barriers and Recommendations to Innovative Ownership Models for Wind Power
Jensen, Louise Krog; Sperling, Karl; Lund, Henrik
Published in:
Energies
DOI (link to publication from Publisher):
10.3390/en11102602
Creative Commons License
CC BY 4.0
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Jensen, L. K., Sperling, K., & Lund, H. (2018). Barriers and Recommendations to Innovative Ownership Models
for Wind Power. Energies, 11(10), [2602]. https://doi.org/10.3390/en11102602
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: December 27, 2020
energies
Article
Barriers and Recommendations to Innovative
Ownership Models for Wind Power
Louise Krog *, Karl Sperling and Henrik Lund
Department of Planning, Aalborg University, Rendsburggade 14, 9000 Aalborg, Denmark;
karl@plan.aau.dk (K.S.); lund@plan.aau.dk (H.L.)
* Correspondence: louise@plan.aau.dk; Tel.: +45-93562354
Received: 18 June 2018; Accepted: 27 September 2018; Published: 29 September 2018


Abstract: Local ownership models have proven to be an important way to avoid local resistance
to onshore wind turbines. As wind power expands into onshore and nearshore wind farms,
such ownership models become of increasing importance, while also undergoing further development.
This paper uses the Choice Awareness theory to examine some of the barriers connected to the
implementation of these new ownership models and presents recommendations to overcome such
barriers. Choice Awareness addresses societal aspects (discourse, socioeconomics, and public
regulation) mainly related to implementing alternatives to existing technologies. For the theory to be
able to embrace the complexity of the transition of the energy system more holistically, we explore
and specify the organizational dimension of choice-eliminating mechanisms. Based on the case
of an NGO’s attempt to bid for a tender for nearshore wind turbines, it is shown how the central
administration prevents new innovative ownership models from entering the tender. A strong path
dependency has led to a conscious or unconscious elimination of projects based on organizational
structures that do not fit the definition of large energy companies. As a result of this, the paper
makes three recommendations for policy changes with the aim to secure equal possibilities for actors
involved in nearshore wind power tenders.
Keywords: energy policy; local ownership; choice awareness; nearshore wind
1. Introduction
The development of plans and strategies for reaching 100% renewable energy systems is
gaining momentum in many countries, regions, municipalities and communities [1–5]. In Denmark,
the government has set a national goal of 100% renewable energy in 2050 [6,7]. It has been suggested
that achieving these goals requires a new understanding of the energy system as a smart energy system
that integrates and balances all energy sectors to obtain the most feasible solutions [8]. Where the
former system was based on fossil fuels utilized in centralized production units, an energy system
based on renewable energy necessitates a real-time utilization of the energy source on its location
(e.g., solar, hydro and wind) [9,10]. This also means that the energy production is moved closer to the
consumers due to the distribution of the renewable energy resources, which may lead to resistance in
the local communities if the planning is not done right [11,12].
Denmark is often highlighted as a frontrunner in public participation in energy planning and
development [13–17] and, up until 2002, the implementation of onshore wind turbines in Denmark
was carried out rather successfully. This was especially due to a wide popular support and local
ownership [15,18]. Examples can be found of onshore wind projects based on ownership models with
a mix of local ownership and trust ownership, where parts of the turnover are used to benefit the local
society (e.g., for new sports facilities). Examples of such projects are wind turbines on the island of
Ærø and in Hvide Sande. In these projects, local citizens are members of the co-operative together with
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local foundations. The local foundations make sure that a part of the turnover from the wind turbines
is re-invested in local development projects for the wider benefit of the local communities [19,20].
Examples of local ownership can also be found for nearshore wind turbines, even though the offshore
market is primarily dominated by large energy companies. Examples of nearshore turbines can be
found outside the island of Samsø and at Middelgrunden in Copenhagen, where half of the 20 turbines
are owned by the Middelgrunden wind turbine co-operative and the other half by DONG Energy
(Since 2 October 2017 known as Ørsted) [21].
However, the onshore wind turbine development is starting to experience local resistance [22,23],
due to challenges in finding good and cheap locations for the turbines. During the last 15–17 years,
a decrease in the local ownership of wind turbines has become a reality and the tendency is moving
towards large-scale industry (Own data based on figures from the Danish Energy Agency and The
Danish Energy Regulatory Authority). This leads to minimal competition, which is seen in relation to
offshore wind turbine farms, where only a few companies, DONG Energy and Vattenfall, own all the
large offshore wind turbine farms in Denmark [24].
Increased focus is placed on nearshore wind turbines in the Danish wind power development,
and recent tender material for nearshore wind turbines bears witness of a tendency to perceive
nearshore wind turbines as a large-scale industry with large energy companies as the main
investors [25]. In the last tender for 350 MW Danish nearshore wind turbines, no projects based
on local ownership were included in the bidding process. This is despite the fact that two projects
(Wind & Welfare and Lemvig Municipality) made a strong effort to participate in the process.
1.1. Research Scope—The Wind & Welfare Project
In the period of 2013–2015, the Danish Energy Agency, on behalf of the Danish government,
organized a tender for up to 350 MW nearshore wind power distributed over six locations along
the Danish coast. The tender was won by the Swedish, state-owned energy company Vattenfall in
competition with three other bids [26].
The case studied in this paper is the Danish grassroots organization Wind People’s attempt to
participate in the national tender for 350 MW nearshore wind turbines with a project “Wind & Welfare”
based on local ownership. Local ownership was to a limited extent included as a possibility in the
tender through the “20% rule”, which initially was introduced in 2008 for onshore wind turbines.
The rule requires that wind power project developers offer 20% of the project shares to local citizens.
The ambition of Wind People was more far-reaching: the goal of the “Wind & Welfare” project was
to sell as many shares as possible to local citizens and community organizations—100%, if possible.
However, the “Wind & Welfare” project could not live up to all pre-qualification criteria for the
tender, and was thus excluded from the final bidding round alongside a municipality-organized bid.
The pre-qualification criteria that the potential bidders should fulfill were [25]:
• The applicant must present an average turnover of 4 billion DKK (~537 million €) over the past
three years.
• The applicant must have an equity ratio of 20% or more. For financial institutions, however,
the credit rating must be BBB- or more (Standard & Poors and Fitch) and/or Baa3 or more
(Moody’s) or an equivalent rating from another recognized credit rating agency.
• The applicant must have at least one reference to an offshore project with an installed capacity of
minimum 30 MW within the last five years.
The biggest hurdle for the “Wind & Welfare” project was the 4 billion DKK turnover requirement.
As a project facilitated by a grassroots organization and based on local ownership, which was
specifically organized with the purpose of bidding on the tender, Wind People did neither have the
size nor could they find an adequate partner who could meet the turnover requirement. The technical
requirement of prior experience with offshore wind was easier for Wind & Welfare to fulfill, for instance,
by hiring experienced consultancy companies [27].
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Local ownership is not a new area in the Danish energy system and planning. However,
local ownership of large energy projects such as offshore and nearshore wind farms have not yet
been seen in the Danish context. The Wind & Welfare project was therefore seen as an innovation
in offshore energy, since the project intended to activate new actors in the market. Wind People
has experience with community-owned onshore wind turbine projects and has developed a local
ownership model, where local citizens can own wind turbine shares individually or in a cooperative
together with a local trust (in Danish “fond”). The trust ensures that parts of the profit from the
turbines are spent on activities beneficial to the local community. This shared ownership model
therefore represents a “social” update of traditional Danish local ownership, as wind turbine profits are
not only distributed to individuals, but also contribute to the local common good. Similar ownership
models have been developed in Scotland (e.g., [28]). Moreover, in terms of its scale, the Wind &
Welfare project represented a first attempt to further develop the Danish local ownership model to
be compatible with the increasing wind turbine and wind farm sizes [29–32]. At the time of the
tender, the Wind & Welfare project was somewhat ahead of the Danish legislation, which had not
made specific provisions for community ownership in renewable energy. This is contrary to the latest
proposal at the EU level, which specifically mentions energy communities [33].
As a critical and interesting aspect of the Wind & Welfare case, Wind People has tried to develop
a project based on the above concept of shared local ownership to bid for the 350 MW nearshore
wind turbines, which was the first attempt to do so in Denmark for a centralized tender. The attempt
from Wind People and their ownership model are described in detail in Jensen and Sperling [27].
The role and ambition of Wind People in the Wind & Welfare project were to organize and facilitate a
broad local ownership amongst specific local actors in the communities close to the nearshore wind
power locations, as well as amongst as many Danish electricity consumers as possible. Wind People
managed to develop a strong ownership model and they would not bid for the tender without having
raised the money for the project, in the form of both a bank loan and advanced commitments from
potential shareholders. The ownership model was structured as a limited partnership where 30% of
the financing would have been sold as shares to limited partners such as private consumers across
Denmark, Danish municipalities and companies. The remaining 70% would have been financed
through a bank loan with Wind People as the responsible loan taker. In practice, this would have
meant that the shares in the Wind & Welfare project would have had a value of 5000 DKK (~670 €),
but with the bank loan they could have been offered at 1500 DKK (~200 €) per share. The limited
partners would have been allowed to buy shares equal to their electricity consumption. The limited
partnership was chosen as the ownership model because private consumers are only liable for their
own capital investment in the partnership [34]. (In the Wind & Welfare project, this would have been
30% of the share value, i.e., 1500 DKK per share. A common organisational model for Danish wind
power cooperatives with many local shareholders has usually been a “partnership” (I/S in Danish).
In this model, joint and several liability applies to the shareholders, meaning that all shareholders are
jointly liable for all assets in the partnership.) The ownership model and the relationship between
different actors are further described in [27]. Regardless of this financial set-up, ultimately, Wind &
Welfare could not fulfill the 4 billion DKK turnover criterion set by the Danish Energy Agency and
could therefore not submit a final bid. As a result of the tender process, it thus seems very unlikely—if
not impossible—that the 350 MW nearshore wind power could be organized and established by a
grassroots organization, as an alternative to the ownership models behind the three bidders eligible
to submit a final bid. This is also indicated in the other locally anchored and municipality-organized
project (Lemvig Municipality) which was also excluded from the bidding process on the grounds that
it was unable to meet the qualification criteria.
1.2. Structure
In Section 1.3, the research problem is presented together with a delimitation of the focus in
the paper. In Section 2, the theoretical frame is outlined. The methodology is described in Section 3.
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In Section 4, the analysis is presented and, in Section 5, the results are discussed. Finally, Section 6
answers the research problem and concludes the paper. An overview of the research process is
presented in Figure 1.Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW  4 of 16 
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1.3. Aim of the Paper
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the aim is to develop a theoretical framework for
analyzing the use of choice-eliminating mechanisms for new innovative ownership models within
the renewable energy sector. Second, the aim is to apply this framework to a concrete case to analyze
choice-eliminating mechanisms in practice.
We focus on the mechanisms used by the central administration (mainly represented by the
Danish Energy Agency, and to some extent also The Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate,
and the Government) to exclude small locally anchored projects, exemplified by the Wind & Welfare
case. The central administration might not have a direct interest in excluding certain actors; however,
as indicated in [27], the central administration is influenced by interests from incumbent energy
companies. In this paper, we delimit ourselves from a more detailed analysis of lobby activities’ role in
shaping regulatory approaches within the central administration. However, in future research, it is
important to investigate this issue further, if projects involving innovative ownership models should
succeed. New actors such as Wind People need to gain a better understanding of the institutional
context that they face, and the central administration needs to understand the real possibilities and
limitations of its legislation.
As we explain in the theory, chapter 2, the exclusion of certain technological choices, actors,
interests, etc., can happen intendedly or unintendedly and at various levels and stages of a
planning process.
The Choice Awareness theory is used to identify different eliminating mechanisms that have an
impact on, in this case, new actors attempting to make a radical technological change in the energy
market by introducing local ownership models to large centralized energy production tenders.
The Wind & Welfare case itself has been described and analyzed in detail in another report [27].
In the present study, the same case serves a different purpose, namely, to specifically identify the
kind of eliminating mechanisms that a central administration can employ in this type of tender
process. Therefore, the identified eliminating mechanisms are seen through the concrete experience
of Wind & Welfare, which makes it possible to identify unintended eliminating mechanisms. We do
acknowledge that we delimit ourselves from an analysis of the central administration’s perspective on
the same mechanisms.
Furthermore, we limit ourselves to only considering the eliminating mechanisms used within
the central administration. We do not include the actions taken by the competing actors, even though
we are aware that these also have a role in the process by, for instance, entering pre-agreements with
manufacturers and consultants that limit the potential network of Wind & Welfare. Further details
regarding the different actors’ actions can be found in [27].
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2. Theoretical Frame
2.1. Choice Awareness
The Choice Awareness theory is used to analyze how the central administration in Denmark
creates and governs conditions and processes that either promote or limit a broad public participation
and ownership of nearshore wind turbines.
Choice Awareness postulates that (technological) choices always exist, even though it might
not seem so or is portrayed otherwise by certain actors. Rooted in Lund’s concrete experience
with analyzing energy alternatives, Choice Awareness presents a number of (analytical) steps to
be taken to raise the awareness of (technological) choices. Furthermore, an important part of the
Choice Awareness theory is to understand that organizations often seek to eliminate certain choices
from political decision-making processes due to their perceptions, interests and path dependencies [8].
A central aspect of the Choice Awareness theory is to support the implementation of Radical Technology
Change and to identify where and how such a change is hindered. The theory of Radical Technological
Change implies that technology consists of the five elements of knowledge, organization, technique,
product and profit. A radical technological change occurs when more than one of the five elements are
altered [8,35].
Choice-Eliminating Mechanisms
Choice Awareness theory has two main theses:
• “When society defines and seeks to implement objectives implying radical technological change, the influence
and discourse of existing institutions will affect the implementation.” ([8], p. 30)
• “Society will benefit from focusing on Choice Awareness, that is, raising the awareness that alternatives do
exist and that it is possible to make a choice.” ([8], p. 34)
When the need or the possibility for radical technological change arises, incumbent organizations
are likely to ignore it, or to make incremental changes to their existing technologies to meet
societal or political pressure. At the same time, incumbent actors are likely to make use of
choice-eliminating mechanisms to eliminate technological alternatives outside their own perception.
Existing organizations that depend on a technology will act to eliminate other choices in the public
debate and the common perception. They will execute power at different levels to eliminate choices
outside their perception [8]. Lund [8] highlighted three different eliminating strategies in the choice
awareness theory:
1. “The exclusion of technical alternatives from the debate and the decision-making arenas.” ([8], p. 30)
2. “The technical evaluation of alternatives on the basis of methodologies that assess the radical new technology
in question as not being relevant to or not complying with the requirements” ([8], p. 30), and
3. “The design of feasibility studies in such a way that radical new technologies are assessed as not being
economically feasible to society” ([8], p. 30)
Choice Awareness focuses on perceiving and analyzing technical alternatives for energy planning,
as the first step in the transition of the energy system. This includes the analytical, political,
organizational, and economic processes that lead to the choice of certain technical alternatives and the
elimination of others. Subsequently, with the increasing penetration of renewable energy technologies,
organizational, ownership and financing factors become increasingly critical in the energy planning
process. From a planning theory point of view, not only technical alternatives, but also actors, actions,
interests and outcomes can be subject to choice awareness and choice elimination (Connelly and
Richardson [36]). Since all decisions involve choices that exclude actors, actions, interests and outcomes
from planning processes, either consciously or unconsciously, it is important that key decisions are
made transparently. This is especially important due to the fact that different exclusion decisions will
result in different consensus and consequences for society [36].
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In this paper, Choice-Eliminating Strategies are used as inspiration to frame an analysis of
the organizational dimension of choice-eliminating mechanisms found in the Wind & Welfare case.
Our main assumption is that the Choice Awareness theory is applicable at a societal and organizational
level, despite the technical focus in the theory. To what extent this is the case based on this study is
described and discussed in the results and discussion sections.
Overall, Choice Awareness has proven to be an adequate tool for identifying elimination
mechanisms in the green transition. Other approaches, such as, for instance, Carbon Lock-In, could also
have been applied to the analysis of the Wind & Welfare case, albeit at a more general level. Carbon
Lock-In is very much focused on path dependency and how institutional, technological and behavioral
systems are locked-in on carbon-intensive technological paths [37]. In our view, both approaches
complement each other well, with the institutional and behavioral types of carbon lock-in being
reflected in the organizational dimension of Choice Awareness, which is the specific focus in this paper.
Similar to Choice Awareness, carbon lock-in is concerned with explaining and overcoming barriers to
radical technological change in view of climate change. We believe that the carbon lock-in approach
offers a suitable macro perspective, whereas Choice Awareness is better applicable to case studies,
such as the one in this paper. This is because Choice Awareness presents a more detailed framework
for analyzing the specific mechanisms that either constrain or enable technological choices in certain
organizations. This is exactly our interest in the Wind & Welfare case, and therefore Choice Awareness
is used as the main theoretical and analytical approach in this paper.
2.2. Temporary Spaces as an Arena for Eliminating Strategies
Innovation literature speaks about temporary spaces in relation to participatory innovation [38].
In these temporary spaces, innovation processes can undergo a development through a meeting
with different actors. Innovation involves movement through several temporary spaces that include
different actors related to the innovation/technology [38]. Clausen and Gunn also outlined how
political discourses and practices can have an influence on the inclusion and exclusion of actors
in theses temporary spaces. Boundaries have to be made in the process, but it is difficult to
ensure that the boundaries do not exclude actors that are important for the innovation processes.
The temporary spaces theory helps to identify where in the tender process different actors would be
able to influence the tender process, but also highlights the “scenes” where the choice-eliminating
mechanisms become apparent.
3. Methodology
The analysis in this paper is based on a case study of the process around a grassroots organization’s
attempt to bid for a tender for nearshore wind turbines in Denmark.
3.1. Critical Case Study
Based on Flyvbjerg’s [39] definition of critical case studies, this case is seen as a critical case study.
The Wind & Welfare project has a strategic importance in terms of assessing the actual possibilities
for projects based predominantly on community and shared ownership to participate in large energy
tenders in Denmark. The Wind & Welfare case is an example of how the central administration
responds to new actors and bottom-up projects in a market that is increasingly dominated by large
energy companies. As an underlying criterion for the critical case study, the central administration’s
reaction towards Wind People and the Wind & Welfare project could have been similar for similar new
projects and actors attempting to enter the existing tender system. The Wind & Welfare case is thus
critical to the assessment of the degree of choice awareness inside the Danish central administration in
terms of how the nearshore wind power sector can and should be developed.
Specifically, as stated in the research problem, the goal of the case study was to explore in
which parts of the tender process and through which kind of strategies—direct, indirect, conscious or
unconscious—Wind People was excluded from the nearshore wind tender. Therefore, the case study
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focused on Wind People’s actions in and related to the tender process, and, accordingly, most of the
empirical data were collected through Wind People. This means that we primarily built the perception
of the tender process from the perspective of Wind People. However, the authors did have access to
some email correspondence between Wind People and the Danish Energy Agency, and internal emails
from the Danish Energy Agency, which gave us information about the perception at the central level.
3.2. Data Collection
The dataset used in this study is the same as used in [27]. It was, however, analyzed in a new
context applying temporary spaces and the choice awareness theory. The dataset is built upon a
qualitative research approach using document analysis, narrative interviews and informants’ sound
recordings. For the interviews and sound recordings, written transcripts were compiled.
A document analysis of the tender material was conducted to understand the terms that potential
bidders should be aware of in the design of the projects. General material from the national level has
been used during this study. Finally, documents that show the correspondence between Wind People
and the Danish Energy Agency or parties representing the government or the Danish Energy Agency,
were analyzed to identify the eliminating mechanisms used, but also to identify the different actors’
perceptions of the tender process and rules.
Furthermore, narrative interviews and sound recordings, in the form of verbal diaries, were used
to obtain knowledge about the tender, from the perspective of Wind People. The narrative interview
is one of the main data collection methods in this study. When a narrative interview form is used,
the respondent has the chance to tell his/her story within an overall theme, but without the interviewee
cross-checking a strict guideline. Furthermore, this approach gives the interviewee the chance to listen
carefully to the story and ask follow-up questions when needed [40,41]. Four narrative interviews with
two representatives from Wind People were conducted (three face to face meetings and one phone
conversation). These were supplemented with access to a diary, which one of the representatives from
Wind People recorded through the process, documenting the process that Wind People was going
through, together with the employee’s reflections related to the different situations (in total 13 days of
spoken diary recordings).
The combination of these three data generation methods forms the basis of the analyzed material
in this study. The analysis was made from the perspective of the NGO, which was also represented in
the narrative interviews and the sound recordings. This paper differs from the previously mentioned
report “Who should own the nearshore wind turbines?” in which we discussed and analyzed Wind
People’s strategies in relation to setting up a bid for the Wind & Welfare project. Our focus in this
paper is on the use of eliminating strategies in the central administration, which come to the surface
through the Wind & Welfare case. Being a critical case, the Wind & Welfare project therefore can be
seen as the “mechanism” that opens up the “black box” of eliminating mechanisms for nearshore wind
power used in the central administration.
4. Results: Organizational Dimensions of Choice-Eliminating Mechanisms Appearing in the
Wind & Welfare Case
Different actors were involved in the tender, which is illustrated in Figure 2. Actors are mapped
not only to get an overview of involved actors, but also to get a picture of the perception within the
Danish Energy Agency.
In Figure 2, the actors are mapped in terms of how close they are placed to decision making in the
tender process.
In the blue inner circle, the tender for the nearshore wind turbines is placed along with the Danish
Energy Agreement of 2012 and legislative frameworks.
In the dark grey circle, the existing network around nearshore wind power can be seen. This is
based on the identified perception within the Danish Energy Agency, who views the tender as “big
business” and therefore only considers a limited number of potential bidders. The Danish Energy
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Agency and the Danish Government seem to be path dependent towards offshore wind as an activity
for large energy companies and they also seem to place nearshore wind power within this path.Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW  8 of 16 
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due to the path dependency in the market and in the Danish Energy Agency. Other actors were 
already committed to actors within the competing network and could therefore not represent the new 
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study; however, it is elaborated on in [27]. 
During the tender process, which is illustrated based on the key activities of the Danish Energy 
Agency, Wind & Welfare’s chances of success were limited through the use of elimination 
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acknowledged as a relatively transparent and common phenomenon, since it took place in a 
i r . ct rs in the tender for 350 MW nearshore wind turbines in Denmark, mapped in relation to
h w closely they are connect d to the Danish Energy Agency and thereby the decision making i the
tend r process. The closer the actors a e placed to the blue inner ci cle, the more likely they are to be
included in the tender process.
In the light grey circle, we place those actor groups which potential bidders depend upon in their
development of the projects. These actors are, e.g., financial actors, consultancy companies and wind
turbine suppliers. The blue and grey circles illustrate the perception found within the Danish Energy
Agency today, and the actors within these circles can therefore also reflect who the Danish Energy
Agency have included directly or indirectly within the temporary spaces for the tender.
Furthest out in Figure 2, a white circle is added to illustrate new actors, as Wind People and
Lemvig Municipality, positioned according to the current perception in the Danish Energy Agency.
The dotted arrow going from the white circle to the dark grey circle illustrates the new actors’ attempt
to enter the market for nearshore wind turbines. Wind People has great difficulty in entering the
“grey circles” and in getting access to the Danish Energy Agency and the nearshore wind tender,
but also in establishing a relation with some actors in the “light grey circle”. Different perceptions
can be found among the actors in the circle. Some of the actors supported the innovative project that
Wind People was trying to organize, but, at the same time, they were not willing to commit to the
project, due to the path dependency in the market and in the Danish Energy Agency. Other actors
were already committed to actors within the competing network and could therefore not represent the
new coming actors on the market (Wind People). A further investigation of this is not in focus in this
study; however, it is elaborated on in [27].
During the tender process, which is illustrated based on the key activities of the Danish Energy
Agency, Wind & Welfare’s chances of success were limited through the use of elimination mechanisms
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in several actions. These are illustrated in Figure 3. By analyzing how these actions have influenced
Wind People’s opportunities to enter into the bidding round for the tender, we can assess to which
degree smaller, not-for-profit project developers were given the opportunity to realistically participate
in the tender. By applying Lund’s Choice Awareness theory on Choice-Eliminating Mechanisms,
“The exclusion of technical alternatives from the debate and the decision-making arenas” ([8], p. 30) can be
identified as the particular mechanism that has led to the Danish goal to install more nearshore wind
turbines. The Energy Agreement from 2012 states that a fixed amount of nearshore wind turbines
should be installed, and other technical alternatives are thereby eliminated from the debate at the
time when the tender is developed. However, this eliminating process should be acknowledged as
a relatively transparent and common phenomenon, since it took place in a parliamentary process at
the governmental level. The electricity capacity could also have been fulfilled by other renewable
technologies; however, this discussion is not within the scope of this paper.
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This paper is concerned with the processes after a technical solution has been found—namely
nearshore wind power—where we suggest that there is a need for raising awareness of the choices
within the organizational set-up around the technical alternative. We found that it was necessary
to investigate how alternative organizational ownership and financing models are eliminated in
the Danish tender process by exploring and clarifying the theory of choice-eliminating mechanisms
to include an organizational dimension. The reason is that the organizational choice-eliminating
mechanisms are not necessarily as transparent and democratic as the abovementioned parliamentary
process around the Energy Agreement, containing the nearshore wind power expansion goal.
Based on Lund’s technical eliminating mechanisms and the Danish Energy Agency’s interaction
with Wind People, we clarified the organizational dimension of Choice Awareness eliminating
mechanisms in Table 1. An important term for both the technical as well as the organizational dimension
of the eliminating mechanisms is the awareness that all decisions involve choices that are either
made consciously or unconsciously. When entering the organizational dimension, conscious choices
can, for instance, be ignoring or refusing inputs or interests from certain actors. An example of an
unconscious choice could be not to invite potential new actors or organizations in the technical dialogue
for the tender process. This could be explained by the Danish Energy Agency’s practices developed
over time in the offshore wind power sector, with a focus on involving mainly large energy actors.
Table 1. Lund’s original Choice-Eliminating Mechanisms are presented, together with the identified
organizational choice-eliminating mechanisms. The third column lists examples of these eliminating
mechanisms identified in relation to the Wind & Welfare case. Each of the examples is explained
further below.
Choice-Eliminating Mechanisms from
the First Choice Awareness Thesis
Organizational Dimension of
Choice-Eliminating Mechanisms in
Choice Awareness Theory Identified
in the Case Study
Examples
(1)“The exclusion of technical alternatives
from the debate and the decision-making
arenas” ([8], p. 30)
(a) Exclusion of actors from the debate
and decision-making arenas
Ex.1: Analysis of potential bidders, only five
actor groups are investigated.
Ex.2: The Danish Energy Agency ignores
potential bidders’ input during the technical
dialogue.
Ex.3: Wind People’s failed attempt to get into
a dialogue with the minister.
Ex.4: Meeting between the Danish Energy
Agency and Wind People where Wind
People’s suggestion regarding requirements
to the prequalification is excluded with
reference to the late timing.
Ex.5: Perception that nearshore wind turbines
are “Big Business”.
(2)“The technical evaluation of alternatives
on the basis of methodologies that assess the
radical new technology in question as not
being relevant to or not complying with the
requirements” ([8], p. 30)
(b) Design of framework conditions that
only make it feasible to some actors to
participate
Ex.6: Pre-qualification criteria.
Ex.6: Short timeframe from publication of
final tender material to deadline for
pre-qualification application.
(3)“The design of feasibility studies in such
a way that radical new technologies are
assessed as not being economically feasible
to society” ([8], p. 30)
(c) Design of feasibility studies in such a
way that radically new organizational,
financing and ownership models are
assessed as not being economically
feasible to society
Occur through a lack of such a feasibility
study prior to the tender.
4.1. Exclusion of Actors from the Debate and Decision-Making Arenas
The first choice-eliminating mechanism for the organizational dimension that we formulate is the
exclusion of some actors from the debate and decision-making arenas. This eliminating mechanism is
very much linked to the first eliminating strategy in the choice awareness theory; i.e., “The exclusion of
technical alternatives from the debate and the decision-making arenas” ([8], p. 30) (see Table 1). The difference
is that it is not technical alternatives that are eliminated in this case, but social groups, specific actors
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and interests that are linked to and seek to promote radically new organizational, financing and
ownership models.
Ex.1: An example of the use of the organizational choice-eliminating mechanism (a) is an analysis
made by the consultancy company Deloitte on behalf of the Danish Energy Agency [42]. The aim of
the analysis was to analyze which consequences different technical criteria would have on different
stakeholders’ possibilities to participate in the tender. The Danish Energy Agency decided which actor
groups should be included in the analysis, and in that way also consciously or unconsciously decided
who should be excluded from the analysis and thereby the debate around the tender. Five actor groups
were included in the analysis: international energy companies, international projects developers,
regional energy companies, “open door” applicants and pension funds/capital funds. The analysis
indicates that especially the design of financial criteria could have a great influence on who can fulfill
this criterion, since actors structure their financial balances differently. Furthermore, it is stressed that
a requirement of joint and several liability would limit financial actors’ willingness to participate in
project consortiums due to the financial risk [42].
Ex.2: An example of a conscious use of the eliminating mechanism (a) is that the Danish Energy
Agency as a part of the tender process set up a technical dialogue, where potential bidders could
give input to the tender material before it was published. Several potential bidders mentioned in
the technical dialogue that they found the economic criteria of a turnover of 4 billion DKK too high
and that the Danish Energy Agency instead should be focusing on solvency and company rating as
criteria for the tender. The Danish Energy Agency assured that it would find an appropriate level in
the final tender material, but kept the high turnover as a criterion and thereby ignored the inputs from
several actors.
Ex.3: Another conscious use of eliminating mechanism (a) appeared when Wind People attempted
to enter into a dialogue with the Minister of Climate and Energy. Wind People contacted the Head
of Office in the Ministry and was promised that the problem of limited access for local projects,
such as Wind & Welfare, to the tender for nearshore wind turbines would be presented to the
Minister. The Ministry would then get back to Wind People with a reaction to their expressed
problem. Neither the Minister nor other representatives from the Ministry did get back to Wind People.
Wind People was later met with a dismissive attitude when they called the Ministry to follow up on
their request.
Ex.4: The last example of conscious use of eliminating mechanism (a) is the Danish Energy
Agency’s reaction at their meeting with Wind People on 26 May 2015; the day of the deadline
for applications for the pre-qualification. At this meeting, Wind People presented two alternative
suggestions to the pre-qualification criteria, which would allow popular projects to bid in the tender
process. The reaction from the Danish Energy Agency to the suggestions was that these could be
interesting to look into in relation to future tender processes, since it would be too late to make changes
in the current process. The Danish Energy Agency used this argument even though Wind People
argued that they had pointed out several times in the tender process that local projects were not able
to fulfill the pre-qualification criteria.
Ex.5: A presumably unconscious use of the organizational choice-eliminating mechanism (a) is a
strong path dependency within the Danish Energy Agency keeping it locked within the perception
that nearshore wind power is “Big Business”. This perception might stem from the DEA’s experiences
from the offshore wind power sector, which is dominated by large private companies. This may
also help explain the other examples related to eliminating mechanism (a). The consequence is that,
already from the outset, NGOs and local projects never appeared as potential bidders in the actual
tender material or in any other material or process related to it.
4.2. Design of Framework Conditions That Make It Feasible for Only Some Actors to Participate
The second choice-eliminating mechanism defined under the organizational dimension is
termed Design of framework conditions that make it feasible for only some actors to participate.
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This eliminating mechanism excludes certain actors and organizations from the formal tender process.
It is mainly evident in the tender material, which sets the boundaries for who and what can be included
in the formal process around the actual tender including pre-qualification and actual submission of
bids. As such, it can be seen as a consequence of choice-eliminating mechanism (a), which is concerned
with the processes leading to the design of the formal rules of the tender.
Ex.6: When defining the pre-qualification criteria, the Danish Energy Agency used the second
organizational choice-eliminating mechanism. The pre-qualification criteria—mainly the 4 billion DKK
turnover criterion—are set at a level that makes it difficult for some actors to meet the requirements.
One can argue that it is not completely unrealistic for all actors to fulfill the requirements. For grassroots
organizations, such as Wind People, it will take longer time to develop a project, due to the fact that
these organizations to some extent depend on voluntary work and therefore do not have the same
resources as private bidders [43]. For instance, it took Wind People a considerable amount of effort and
time to negotiate with organizations that could be willing to provide the 4 billion DKK security [27].
Large established energy companies have better preconditions for developing a project than, e.g.,
grassroots organizations. In this way, this eliminating mechanism limits the competition on the
energy market.
4.3. Design of Feasibility Studies in Such a Way that Radically New Organizational, Financing and Ownership
Models Are Assessed as Not Being Economically Feasible to Society
The third choice-eliminating mechanism that we formulate in the organizational dimension is the
Design of feasibility studies in such a way that radically new organizational, financing and ownership
models are assessed as not being economically feasible to society. The eliminating mechanism appears
indirectly through the absence of such feasibility studies at a governmental and societal level. To our
knowledge, the central administration has not analyzed the potential societal benefits of different
organizational, financing and ownership models in this case.
5. Discussion
The transition of the energy system is a complex process with different aspects and interests.
Lund’s Choice Awareness theory emphasizes how the perceptions of established actors in the energy
scene can lead to the elimination of technical alternatives in energy planning. At the same time,
Connelly and Richardson [36] state that most decisions involve choices that exclude actors, actions,
interests and outcomes from planning processes. These are aspects that are not only connected to
the technical choices in the energy system, but also to the more societal and organizational aspects
concerning, for instance, who should be involved in the transition of the energy system. We argue
that the choice awareness theory could therefore be specified to better embrace both technical and
organizational dimensions of energy planning.
In this paper, we add to the existing choice awareness theory by defining three organizational
choice-eliminating mechanisms concerning the elimination of certain actors and organizational
structures in the energy system. These new choice-eliminating mechanisms are closely related to the
original mechanisms and do add a new dimension to the theory. An expansion of the choice awareness
theory to also include organizational eliminating mechanisms strengthens the theory to better embrace
the complexity of both technical and organizational challenges in the energy system.
The choice awareness theory builds on another thesis, besides choice-eliminating mechanisms,
which is important to the overall use of the theory. The second thesis argues that society can benefit
from knowing which choices exist. Lund [8] highlighted three ways to promote this awareness:
• “Promoting the description of concrete technological alternatives in various debates and decisions on new
plans and projects at all levels
• Promoting feasibility study methodologies that include relevant political objectives in the analyses
• Promoting the concrete description of public regulation measures to advance new technologies” ([8], p. 34)
Energies 2018, 11, 2602 13 of 16
Following the second thesis of the choice awareness theory, we propose the following
policy changes:
• The involvement of actors, including locally anchored actors, should be broadened in the
development of future tenders for nearshore wind power in Denmark. This implies that a broad
variety of actors are invited to join the process at an early stage. This could, e.g., be done by inviting
relevant NGOs to join the decision-making processes in relation to the specific tender rules.
• Tender rules should be defined in a way that does not exclude locally anchored projects. It is
important that the different qualification criteria do not exclude certain actors just based on
their organizational set-up. This means that economic requirements should be defined in a way
that makes sure that potential bidders have the needed financial stability to realize the project,
but without excluding certain ownership models. Furthermore, is it important that the timeframe
leaves enough room for new actors to organize their projects.
• A support scheme and secretariat should support actors in preliminary analyses, feasibility studies,
etc. New actors would not have the same professional network as already established actors on
the market. For new actors to be able to develop realistic projects, a central support scheme that
supplies funding to gain the needed knowledge could bridge this gap. Such a support scheme
could specifically target non-profit actors or organizational set-ups with a high share of local
ownership and could entail a central secretariat providing advice to these projects.
As the implementation of smart energy systems has as one consequence that energy production is
being moved closer to local communities and citizens [8,44,45], a radical change in the organization of
ownership of the energy system is needed to secure wide support for this local expansion of production
units. The suggested policy changes would help to gain more transparency in the tender process and
ensure that all actors have equal opportunities to make a deliberate decision to enter a tender.
We have proposed three organizational choice-eliminating mechanisms based on a critical
case study, arguing that the eliminating mechanisms can be applied to similar cases. However,
since this study to a large extent relies on information gathered through Wind People, it is also
contingent on the correctness of this information, for instance, regarding Wind People’s perception
and experience of particular choice-eliminating mechanisms. Furthermore, it is possible that the
identified elimination mechanisms would have been different if Wind People had acted differently
in the process. This concern, we believe, is somewhat offset by the fact that the phenomenon of local
ownership of off-shore and nearshore wind turbines at such a large scale is extremely limited at the
grassroots organization level and in the Danish Energy Agency. This means that Wind People took
on the “pioneer” role on behalf of other NGOs and grassroots organizations, leaving a good chance
that many of the same elimination mechanisms would probably have been identified, had another
grassroots organization attempted the same as Wind People. Due to Wind People’s intense attempt to
enter the tender, their close interaction with the Danish Energy Agency, as well as their willingness to
share important information, we were able to identify the elimination mechanism used in the process.
As a grassroots organization, Wind People does not represent any particular business interest and
comes close to acting “on behalf of society”, which in our view increases the reliability of their data.
However, to further validate the eliminating mechanisms we could have collected and used data from
other actors involved in the same tender process to see if they have had similar experiences throughout
the process. This could have been, e.g., Lemvig municipality, who also tried to organize a locally
based project, and/or Vattenfall, who won the tender. Investigating both the “winner” and the “losers”
would provide information that could show whether all actors are treated identically.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates the mechanisms used by the central administration to exclude certain
actors and organizational structures from participation in renewable energy projects. Choice Awareness
theory is used to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing new actors’ attempt to make radical
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changes in the market for renewable energy. We argue that the Choice Awareness theory benefits from
a specification of the organizational dimensions of the theory. By doing so, the theory is more likely to
embrace all challenges in the transition to the smart energy systems.
The analysis of the case study reveals that several organizational choice-eliminating mechanisms
were used by the central administration to exclude the Wind & Welfare project from entering the
market for nearshore wind power. We argue that this is not desirable if the green transition of the
energy system should succeed with support from citizens and the local communities hosting the
energy production units. Therefore, we suggest a number of changes to future policy frameworks for
tenders for nearshore wind power.
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